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Abstract 
 
We model an infinitely-repeated conflict between two factions who both have a desire to 
exact revenge for past destruction suffered. The destruction suffered by a player is a stock 
that grows according to his opponent’s destructive efforts and the rate at which past 
destruction is forgotten (i.e., depreciates). This gives a differential game. We find that a 
desire for revenge can cause a low-ability player to exert a higher effort than a high-
ability player, which means that the former may have a higher probability of success in a 
given period. Given a desire for revenge, we find that, the conflict initially escalates and 
eventually reaches a steady state. When there is no desire for revenge, the conflict 
reaches a steady state immediately. The conflict is sufficiently less destructive if the rate 
at which past destruction is forgotten is sufficiently high. We briefly discuss how our 
results apply to the USA’s invasion of Iraq, reconstruction assistance to Lebanon after the 
1975-1990 war, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
 
 
Keywords: conflict, differential game, open-loop equilibrium, revenge. 
JEL Classification numbers: D74. 
**Corresponding author: phone:  519-824-4120, fax: 519-763-8497. 
*We thank Kjell Hausken and Zane Spindler for their helpful comments and Henry Thille 
for useful discussions. This research is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 
 1
 If it will feed nothing else, it will feed my revenge. -  William Shakespeare, The Merchant 
of Venice (Shylock act III) 
 
Revenge is profitable. - Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (ch. XI) 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The multiplicity of conflicts in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East requires 
the attention and efforts of academics and policy makers. Conflicts retard economic 
progress, lead to the destruction of human lives and property, introduce divisions among 
third parties (e.g., countries), and makes the world worse off. Therefore, the analysis, 
understanding, and possible solution of conflicts require the attention of scholars. 
The desire to seek revenge in conflicts is sometimes the major cause of continuing 
conflict over and beyond the original cause of the conflict (see, for example, Kim and 
Smith, 1993; Chagnon, 1988; Juah, 2002). Examples are Israel/Palestine, USA response 
to attacks of US troops in Iraq, etc. Each faction in the conflict may want to “throw the 
last punch”.  
The desire for revenge appears to be a common human trait. As Elster (1990, p. 
862) observes “[R]evenge - the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose 
suffering upon those who have made one suffer, because they made one suffer - is a 
universal phenomenon.” This desire is evidenced in the quotes at the beginning of this 
article. 
In pre-industrial societies, revenge was seen as an integral part of justice and 
retribution. This still persists in certain societies. Indeed, some people justify capital 
punishment on the grounds that someone who has taken another human being’s life 
deserves to have this life taken (i.e., an eye for an eye). As Nussbaum (1999, p. 157-158) 
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observes “[T]he primitive sense of the just — remarkably constant from several ancient 
cultures to modern institutions … — starts from the notion that a human life … is a 
vulnerable thing, a thing that can be invaded, wounded, violated by another’s act in many 
ways. For this penetration, the only remedy that seems appropriate is a counter invasion, 
equally deliberate, equally grave. And to right the balance truly, the retribution must be 
exactly, strictly proportional to the original encroachment. It differs from the original act 
only in the sequence of time and in the fact that it is response rather than original act — a 
fact frequently obscured if there is a long sequence of acts and counteracts.” 
To the extent that the desire for revenge is motivated by the past, it goes against 
economists’ intuition of letting bygones be bygones. In standard economics, sunk costs 
should not matter. However, in reality, sunk costs matter.1 And one such example is the 
desire to exact revenge. This desire may stem from preferences that reflect loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For example, in a war, one may want to exact revenge 
because not doing so is tantamount to losing the war (McAfee et al, 2007). 
 The desire for revenge appears to be linked to a tit-for-tat strategy in repeated 
prisoner-dilemma-type games. Tit-for-tat strategy retaliates or punishes an opponent for 
not co-operating in a previous period. One would therefore think that a folk-theorem type 
result could sustain co-operation in an infinitely-repeated conflict even if the factions care 
about revenge. In such games, players co-operate because they worry about the adverse 
repercussions of non-cooperative behavior in the future. But given a history of conflicts,  
players who have a desire for revenge may only care about the past. They may want to 
                                                 
1 See the examples in McAfee et al., (2007) and the references therein. 
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co-operate only after they have exacted revenge. But if both factions reason in this way, 
then co-operation cannot be sustained.  
Indeed, a key difference between tit-for-tat strategy and exacting revenge (as modeled 
in this paper) is that in tit-for-tat, the player who retaliates does not derive utility from the 
revenge per se. He only derives a positive utility if his retaliatory action causes his 
opponent to co-operate in the future. Hence tit-for-tat is forward-looking2 while exacting 
revenge - as modeled in this paper and in reality – need not be: revenge is backward-
looking. This distinction is akin to the legal and philosophical discussions of punishment 
for the purpose of deterrence and reform vis-à-vis punishment for the purpose of 
atonement (justice). It is the basis of the legal debate on the merits of retributive justice 
vis-à-vis restorative justice. This difference in perspectives explains why some South 
Africans were not satisfied with the mandate and job of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission3 in post-apartheid South Africa. 
To be sure, there is a wide literature on contests and conflicts. However, our work 
will be the first in the economics literature to examine revenge in conflicts. There is, of 
course, a literature which studies the conditions under which conflicts escalate or end. 
Examples are Nalebuff (1986), Carlson (1995), Fearon (1996), Bester and Konrad 
(2005), Molinari (2000) and Konrad and Kovenock (2005). But none has focused on the 
                                                 
2 Commenting on the attractiveness of tit-for-tat, Axelrod (1984, p. 54) observed that “[W]hat accounts for 
TIT-FOR-TAT's robust success is its combination of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving and clear. Its 
niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from 
persisting whenever defection is tried. Its forgiveness helps restore mutual co-operation. And its clarity 
makes it intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term co-operation.” For a critique of this far-
reaching claim, see Martinez-Coll and Hirshleifer (1991) and Binmore (1998). 
3 The official government webpage of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is 
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/. The report of the commission is available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/ 
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role of a desire for revenge.4 Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007), Carment and Rowlands 
(1998), Chang et al. (2007), and Siqueira (2003) examined third-party intervention in 
conflicts; Garfinkel and Skarpedas (2000) studied how conflict can arise in a world of 
complete information; and Skaperdas (1992) investigated the conditions for peace and 
conflict in world with no property rights. None of these works focuses on how the desire 
for revenge fuels conflict. 
Unlike economists, the role of revenge in wars, conflicts, and social relationships has 
been studied by philosophers, legal scholars, political scientists, and psychologists. 
Examples are the works of Elster (1990), Juah (2002), Chagnon (1988), Suny (1993), 
Stuckless and Goranson (1992) and Kim and Smith (1993). 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section present a differential game model 
of revenge in conflicts. Section 3 presents an open-loop equilibrium analysis of the 
model. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. A model of revenge in conflicts 
Consider two factions, 1 and 2, in an infinitely-repeated conflict (war). The 
beginning of time is period 0. Effort of faction i in period t is given by xi(t), i = 1,2. 
The original cause of the conflict is a given resource.5 The factions compete for this 
resource in every period t. For example, in the Israel/Palestine conflict the resource may 
be land which is used for settlements. In every period t, both factions value the resource 
at v > 0. Moreover, there is a second benefit from being successful in the conflict, namely 
                                                 
4 Glaeser (2005) is an interesting analysis of hatred. 
5 Based on our model, the reader can easily verify that no conflict (i.e., zero effort levels) is not a Nash 
equilibrium in period 0. 
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a value of revenge. Efforts by the factions result in the destruction of human life and 
property. This destruction fuels the conflict and creates the desire for revenge. In period t, 
the value of revenge to faction i is 
)]t(s),t(s[R)t(R jiii =         (1) 
where i = 1, 2, j ≠ i and ( )is t  is the accumulated stock of destruction inflicted by faction 
i on faction j.  
The revenge function in (1) has the following properties: 
(i) )]t(s),t(s[R jii > 0, if ( )js t 0> , j ≠ i. 
(ii) )]t(s),t(s[R jii  = 0, if ( )js t 0= , j ≠ i  
(iii) 0)t(s/R ii >∂∂ , j ≠ i. 
(iv) 0)t(s/R ii ≤∂∂ . 
Property 1 means that a faction has a positive valuation for revenge, if the cumulative 
destruction of its property and human life is positive. Property 2 means this valuation is 
zero, if there has not been any loss of human lives or property. Property 3 means that the 
higher is the cumulative destruction suffered the higher is the value of revenge. Property 
4 means that the value of revenge is non-increasing in the cumulative destruction that is 
inflicted on the other faction.6 
 The stock of destruction evolves through time as follows 
)t(is)t(ix)t(is δ−γ=&         (2) 
                                                 
6It is important to note that revenge is fueled by past destruction not current destruction. However, the 
continuous-time formulation of the problem may not make this fact clear enough. If we were using a 
discrete-time formulation, we would have written the value of revenge in period t as a function of 
accumulated destruction up to period t-1. 
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where γ, δ ≥ 0. The stock of destruction decays at rate, δ . This decay is due to the fact 
that, for example, destroyed buildings are rebuilt resulting in people forgetting some of 
the past destruction of buildings (i.e., 0 < δ < 1) and so may no longer receive a value of 
revenge from it. People may also forget past destruction or their desire for revenge may 
wane even if there is no such reconstruction of buildings. This decay may be a reason 
why the conflict will perhaps end in some period or, at least, why the conflict may attain 
a steady state in which the intensity of the conflict is low.  
In each period, the probability that faction i can successfully exact revenge is   
)xx(
2
1)x,x(P jijii −η+= ,         (3) 
where i = 1,2 , j ≠ i and η is a positive parameter.7 This probability function is increasing 
in a faction’s own effort but decreasing in the effort of his opponent. The latter effect 
reflects the fact that his opponent will counter his attempt to exact revenge while also 
trying to exact his (i.e., the opponent) own revenge. We could make a distinction between 
offensive effort and defensive effort but this will only complicate the model without 
affecting our main results. Indeed, this distinction is not necessary insofar as offensive 
effort could also be a form of defense. 
For simplicity, we assume that the equation in (3) is also the probability that faction i 
will successfully capture or defend the resource (e.g., land) in a given period. 
To elaborate, the conflict erupts in period 0 over the resource of value v > 0. Suppose, 
for a moment, that the conflict over the initial resource is resolved after the period 0 
battle, where each faction captures a proportion of the resource according to the success 
                                                 
7 See Che and Gale (2000) for analysis of this type of difference-form contest success function. For our 
purposes, this function is easier to work with than the Tullock ratio-form function.  
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function above. Therefore, further conflicts are fueled by the need to seek revenge due to 
the destruction of human lives on both sides. The assumption is that period 0 efforts 
resulted in the loss of human lives and property. Then in an attempt to seek revenge in 
period 1, there will also be efforts which will lead to further loss of human lives, giving 
cause for further revenge and so on.8 But in reality, the conflict over the initial resource 
(e.g., land) need not be resolved in period 0. There is indeed a fine line between the 
desire for revenge fuelling the conflict and the quest to appropriate the resource fuelling 
the conflict. We shall therefore assume that in their desire to seek revenge, each faction 
takes into account that winning the battle over the resource is also a possibility. Thus in 
each period, the resource (e.g., land) is also up for grabs. This assumption also allows us 
to compare our results to the benchmark case where there is no revenge and there is a 
contest over the resource in every period. 
In every period t, faction i incurs the cost of effort, given by Ci(xi(t)) and suffers a 
cost of destruction given by βxj(t), β ≥ 0, and j ≠ i, i = 1, 2. We assume that Ci(xi(t)) is 
increasing and strictly convex. 
The present value of faction i’s net benefit could be written as 
( ) dte))t(x(C)t(x)](Rv)[t(PW rt
0
iijiii
−
∞
∫ −β−⋅+=      (4) 
where r > 0 is the common discount rate and i ≠ j, i = 1,2, j = 1,2.9  
 
                                                 
8For the sake of exposition, we sometimes couch the discussion in parts of this article within a discrete-time 
framework. 
9 As noted above, revenge is a function of past destruction which enters the objective function as a positive 
value.   
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2.1 Some remarks on modeling revenge 
Before we proceed to the solution of the model, we think a few remarks about how we 
have modeled revenge are in order.  
It is important to note that the positive value of revenge does not reflect 
masochistic preferences. A faction does not derive satisfaction from suffering destruction. 
Destruction is costly to the victim. However, given that destruction has been suffered in 
the past, the victim derives satisfaction from exacting revenge. 
For the sake of exposition, consider faction 1. It is obvious that the ability to exact 
revenge must be positively related to the effort of the faction seeking revenge. We have 
captured this effect by making x1 to positively influence faction 1’s benefit function 
through the P1 function but to negatively affect faction 2 through the – βx1 term in faction 
2’s payoff function. 
To be sure, the true cost of faction 1’s destructive effort on faction 2 could be βx1 
but faction 1 might possibly think it is αx1, where α > β. That is, faction 1 could 
overestimate the effect of his destructive effort on faction 2. Faction 1 may genuinely 
believe that this is the case or it may be part of an inflammatory political rhetoric. 
However, this issue is irrelevant in our open-loop equilibrium because the equilibrium 
efforts are independent of β. Also, a successful revenge need not imply that βx1 must be 
equal to R1, since the cost of past destruction could be different for the avenger (i.e., the 
victim) and the perpetrator. Furthermore, the value of revenge to the avenger may be 
different from the cost of destruction to his opponent. For example, a faction that wants 
to avenge the loss of a hundred lives may see his opponent’s loss of more than a hundred 
lives or less than a hundred lives as the desired or successful revenge. This may stem 
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from different sensitivities to the loss of life which may be driven, for example, by 
different religious and secular beliefs. We find, though, that in equilibrium x1 is 
positively related to R1. 
One may argue that past destruction should be completely forgotten or taken out 
of future revenge-seeking calculus after it has been successfully avenged. This means that 
δ = 1 after past destruction has been successfully avenged.10 We do not make this 
assumption for the following reasons: First, the destruction suffered by a faction is 
narrated by older generations to younger generations, regardless of whether they were 
successfully avenged. Long-standing foes continually remind themselves of the 
destruction suffered from the other group. The idea is to maintain group solidarity, keep 
the struggle ongoing, and to be wary of their foes. Such constant reminders could bring 
back memories of past destruction that was successfully avenged and fuel current 
revenge.11 Second, since the avenger will invariably suffer some losses in the current 
period even if the revenge was successful, there is usually nothing like a costless revenge 
in the current period. And even if there is, the enemy will also attempt to avenge previous 
revenge. This is what Nussbaum (1999) referred to as “… a long sequence of acts and 
counteracts”. Hence current destruction suffered in the process of exacting revenge or an 
enemy’s destructive response to one’s previous revenge could bring back memories of 
past destruction that was successfully avenged. Revenge creates an unending cycle of 
animosity which may draw its momentum from past destruction suffered several periods 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that our results will not change if faction i derived some value of revenge in the 
event of an unsuccessful attempt at exacting revenge, so long as this value is smaller than Ri. 
11 Indeed, the revenge function (i.e., satisfaction from revenge) could change over time depending how 
radical the current generation is relative to previous generations. For simplicity, we keep the revenge 
function constant and only allow the state variables to change over time. 
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ago. For these reasons, we do not assume that δ = 1. Instead, we assume that 0 < δ < 1 
even if past destruction is successfully avenged. 
 
3. Open-loop Equilibrium 
We look for an open-loop equilibrium. An open-loop equilibrium seems more 
realistic within the context of revenge in conflicts. As noted by Hume (1898), revenge is 
an emotionally charged reaction leading people who seek revenge to knowingly ignore 
certain consequences of their actions.12 When people decide to take revenge, they may 
not take into account the possibility that their actions could lead to retaliation by their 
opponent. They just do it (i.e., seek revenge). This is consistent with the rationale behind 
the open-loop strategy where the state variable (i.e., the level of accumulated destruction) 
is ignored by a faction. In a closed-loop case, the factions will take into account the fact 
that their destructive efforts in the current period could lead to retaliation by their 
opponent in future periods and therefore they will suffer more destruction.13 This may 
have a desirable restraining effect. However, we doubt that conflicts like civil wars and 
wars in the Middle East and other parts of the world, once they had begun and were 
somewhat fueled by a desire for revenge, necessarily involved these kinds of calculations. 
Indeed, our open-loop analysis leads to very intuitive results that are consistent with 
casual empiricism. 
                                                 
12 Hume (1898, appendix II) notes that  “[W]ho see not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, 
may be so eagerly pursued as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease, interest, and safety 
and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we give an enemy.” This, 
however, does not mean that the desire for revenge is not driven by some modicum of rational decision 
making. It is only less so. However, the fact remains, as echoed by Hume, that people could go to great 
lengths to exact revenge. 
13 As noted earlier, we sometimes couch certain arguments within a discrete-time framework to ease 
exposition. 
 
 11
To obtain the open-loop equilibrium, we assume that the factions condition their 
effort choices on calendar time t only and take as given the strategy of the other faction. 
Faction i maximizes the present value of its net benefit in (4) subject to  
si(0) ≡ 0is > 0, ( ) ( ) ( )i i is t x t s t= γ − δ& and )t(s)t(x)t(s jjj δ−γ=& , j ≠ i, i = 1, 2. 
The current value Hamiltonian for faction 1 is 
]s)t(x[]sx[)x(C)t(x)]s,s(Rv))[t(x,x(PH 2211111122112111 δ−γµ+δ−γλ+−β−+=    (5) 
where the λs and the µs represent co-state variables. Denoting the first derivative by a 
prime and by indicating the variable with respect to which a derivative is taken on the 
left-hand-side below in square brackets beside the relevant equation, we obtain the 
following optimality conditions from (5): 
[x1]: 0)x(C)]s,s(Rv))[t(x,x(P 111211211 =γλ+′−+′      (6) 
[s1]: )s,s(R))t(x,x(P)r(H)r( 2112111111 ′−λδ+=′−λδ+=λ&     (7) 
[s2]: )s,s(R))t(x,x(P)r(H)r( 2122111111 ′−µδ+=′−µδ+=µ&    (8) 
and the transversality conditions 
0)t(s~)t(elim 11
rt
t =λ−∞→   0)t(s~)t(elim 21rtt =µ−∞→    (9) 
where the tilde over the state variable means that (9) has to be satisfied for each feasible 
value of the state variables. By the same arguments, we obtain for faction 2 
[x2]: 0)x(C)]s,s(Rv))[t(x,x(P 222212211 =γλ+′−+′−     (10) 
[s2]: )s,s(R)]t(x,x(P1[)r(H)r( 2122112122 ′−−λδ+=′−λδ+=λ&    (11)  
[s1]: )s,s(R)]t(x,x(P1[)r(H)r( 2122112122 ′−−µδ+=′−µδ+=µ&    (12) 
and the transversality conditions  
0)t(s~)t(elim 22
rt
t =λ−∞→   0)t(s~)t(elim 12rtt =µ−∞→    (13) 
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To simplify the analysis, we assume that 2211 as)s,s(R = , 1122 as)s,s(R = , where 
a > 0. Hence, 0s/R ii =∂∂  for all i. This is a reasonable assumption. A player’s desire for 
revenge may depend on the destruction suffered but not on the destruction caused to his 
opponent.14 This is akin to a psychological phenomenon, formalized by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), where gains (in this case, destruction inflicted on others) are weighted 
less than losses (i.e., destruction suffered). Here we assume that the destruction inflicted 
on others is completely disregarded in a faction’s revenge-seeking calculus. We also 
assume that 21111 x2
c)x(C = , 22222 x2
c)x(C = , where 0c,c 21 > .  
Given 0s/R ii =∂∂ , it can be shown using (7) and (9) that λ1(t) = 0 and using (11) 
and (13) that λ2(t) = 0 for all t and i.15 Then (6) and (10) yield the optimal effort levels, 
which are functions of accumulated destruction, as: 
2
11
1 sc
a
c
vx η+η=∗ , 1
22
2 sc
a
c
vx η+η=∗        (14) 
To see that the effort levels in (14) are indeed equilibrium efforts, note that the 
effort levels can be rewritten as ∗ix = (η/ci)(v + Ri), i = 1,2. In an open-loop equilibrium, a 
player chooses the time path of his actions assuming that the time path of his opponent’s  
actions is fixed. In any period t, a player’s does not care about his own state variable but  
cares about his opponent’s state variable in the previous period via its effect on his desire  
                                                 
14 A simple revenge function which satisfies our assumptions including ∂Ri/∂si ≠ 0 is Ri = asj(sj – si)2,  
i ≠ j, i = 1,2 , j = 1,2. However, the dynamics of conflict is very difficult to analyze in this case because it 
requires the solution to a two-dimensional system of complicated non-linear differential equations. 
15Intuitively, if player i’s own state variable does not enter his payoff function and he does not condition his 
strategies on this state variable, then the shadow price of this state variable must be zero.  
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for revenge. 16 Since, for example, player 1 does not care about s1, has no control over s2 
and treats the time path of x2 and, for that matter s2, as fixed, it follows that player 1 in 
each period sees himself as being in a stationary (static) contest with prize (v + R1). A 
similar argument holds for player 2. The efforts levels in (14) are the unique Nash 
equilibrium values of a static contest with prize (v + Ri) for player i. Hence, the effort 
levels in (14) are the unique open-loop equilibrium effort levels.17 If there were no 
revenge, the problem in each stage will obviously be stationary. The solution is  
∗
ix  = (η/ci)v, which is the solution when Ri = 0 in (14) for all t and i.  
Inserting (14) into the state equations in (2) yields a two-dimensional system of 
linear differential equations in s1 and s2: 
2
1
1
1
1 sc
as
c
vs η+δ−η=& , 21
22
2 ssc
a
c
vs δ−η+η=&      (15) 
By determining the eigenvalues and the eigenvectors of this system, it can be shown that 
the solution is 
t
1
2211t
1
2211
11
21 e
c2
ckck
e
c2
ckck
s)t(s θθ∞
++−+=      (16) 
t
2
2211t
2
1122
22
21 e
c2
ckck
e
c2
ckck
s)t(s θθ∞
++−+=     (17) 
 
                                                 
16In a closed-loop equilibrium, a player would take into account the fact that the future value of his state 
variable affects his opponent’s future value of revenge and hence his opponent’s future effort. The absence 
of this effect makes the open-loop equilibrium very easy to find. As argued earlier, the absence of this 
effect is consistent with revenge-taking calculus.  
17 Given the above reasoning, the equilibrium effort levels with a Tullock contest success function and a 
linear cost function, cixi, is ∗ix = cj(v + Ri)2(v + Rj)/[cj(v + Ri) + ci(v + Rj)]2, i = 1,2. However, the dynamics 
of conflict is very difficult to analyze in this case because it requires the solution to a two-dimensional 
system of non-linear differential equations. Note that the equilibrium effort levels in (14) are independent 
of β. This is a consequence of the open-loop equilibrium. 
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where 
21
1 cc
aη−δ−=θ ,  
21
2 cc
aη+δ−=θ       (18) 
are the two eigenvalues of (15), 
22
21
2
2
1
acc
)ac(vs η−δ
η+δη=∞ , 22
21
2
1
2
acc
)ac(vs η−δ
η+δη=∞       (19) 
are the steady state values of accumulated destruction and 
∞−= 1011 ssk , ∞−= 2022 ssk         (20) 
are given constants.  
For a meaningful steady state we must have 0si ≥∞  and, hence, 22212 acc η>δ . 
The eigenvalues in (18) are then both negative which implies that the solution in (16) and 
(17) converges to the stable steady state given by (19). This will not be the case if δ = 0. 
Therefore decay stabilizes the conflict and eventually leads to a steady state. Note that 
xi(0) =  (η/ci)v < )asv)(c/(x jii
∞∞ +η= , i = 1,2, j = 1, 2, j ≠ i.  This gives the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: If factions in a conflict are motivated by the desire to seek revenge, then 
the conflict escalates through time and eventually reaches a steady state. With no desire 
for revenge, the conflict reaches a steady state right from the beginning of the conflict. 
Also, the steady state effort level is higher with revenge than with no revenge. 
Note that if c1 > c2, then ∞∞ < 21 ss . Then using equation (14) we obtain the result 
that it is possible to have *2x1x >∗  even if c1 > c2. Notice that this result is possible 
although both factions have the same revenge functions. It is not driven by different 
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degrees of satisfaction from exacting revenge. This result might explain why a faction 
with less efficient conflict technology can squarely match one with a more efficient 
conflict technology. Note, however, that this result is impossible when none of the parties 
has a desire for revenge. We summarize this result in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: If factions in a conflict are motivated by the desire to seek revenge, then 
the militarily inferior faction might exert a greater effort than the militarily superior 
faction. Hence, the militarily inferior faction may have a higher probability of winning 
the conflict in some periods.18 If they both have no desire for revenge, then the militarily 
superior faction will always exert a greater effort. 
Recall that the higher is δ, the higher is the rate at which past destruction is 
forgotten. Since 0/si <δ∂∂ ∞ for all i, this result and the equilibrium effort levels imply 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: If factions in a conflict are motivated by the desire to seek revenge, then 
the higher is the rate at which past destruction by an opponent is forgotten, the lower is 
the steady-state level of effort in the conflict.  
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Proposition 3 implies that historical narratives of the atrocities of one group 
against  another, while useful as a way of understanding the past, may also have the 
undesirable effect of increasing the cost of conflict especially between groups with a 
                                                 
18 This seemingly counter-intuitive result is not surprising when one thinks of contests with endogenous 
valuations. In a recent contribution, Sela and Cohen (2005) find that in a contest where the winner’s effort 
is fully re-imbursed, a low-ability contestant could have a higher success probability than a high-ability 
contestant. Proposition 1 is based on the fact that a high-ability contestant’s effort positively influences the 
valuation of a low-ability contestant and vice versa. 
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history of conflict such as the Israelis and Palestinians, the Serbs and Croats, and the 
Hutus and Tutsis. In contrast, reconstruction assistance such those given to Lebanon after 
the 1975-1990 war may help in increasing the rate at which past destruction (physical) is 
forgotten, although memories of the destruction of human lives is unlikely to be affected 
by such reconstruction assistance. 
In war, it is sometimes the case that superior military strength may not be enough 
against the resolve and determined spirit of an enemy. A case in point is the USA’s 
invasion of Iraq. Proposition 2 suggests that the desire for revenge may partly account for 
this resolve. A faction with inferior military technology might exert a higher effort than 
one with superior military technology, so long as the former faction is motivated by 
revenge. This is because the desire for revenge increases the valuation of the faction who 
has suffered more destruction. If the low-ability faction’s valuation is sufficiently high, 
then he will exert a higher effort. If this happens in a steady state, then it will continue 
forever. So in a steady state, the low-ability faction’s higher effort does not increase the 
cumulative destruction suffered by the high-ability faction to the point where the high-
ability faction begins to exert a higher effort because it has a higher valuation.  
We also found that while revenge may cause a conflict to escalate, it eventually 
reaches a steady state.  
In conclusion, we hope that our work has shed some light on our understanding of 
the effect of revenge on the dynamics of conflict and will lead to further work in this 
area. For example, an interesting but very challenging extension is to endogenize 
preferences for revenge. Why are some groups more revenge-driven than others? There 
may be evolutionary reasons for revenge. 
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